Sponsors of war: Syria rebels financed by shady figures with hidden agendas
Anthony Loyd
A distant sponsor finances the war among the olive groves and walnut trees high on the
Jebel Akrad mountains. Sometimes he supplies the rebel fighters there with weapons
and ammunition. More often he gives them money, hundreds of thousands of Syrian
pounds, that are carried along hidden trails by a courier coming from Turkey.
With the sponsor’s support the rebels can raid, harry and ambush the logistic routes
and outposts of the Syrian army in the valley beneath them. Without it, the hundred
men of the “Thwar Tahrir” khattiba (brigade), one of a dozen rebel units in the area,
would be little more than desperate renegades struggling to survive.
There is one major problem in the relationship. The rebels do not know who their
sponsor is. “We know what we are fighting against, but we don’t know exactly who we
are fighting for,” admitted the khattiba’s commander, Lieutenant Ahmad, a tall
athletic man in his mid-twenties who was an infantry officer in the Syrian army before
defecting to join the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) seven months ago.
“A middleman in Turkey masks the sponsor’s identity. We can never deal with him
directly. At the moment there are no conditions to the money and weapons we receive.
But I’m worried that one day there might be.”
The commander’s concerns epitomise the fears shared by numerous opposition
elements inside Syria, as well as Western powers and the wider international
community.
The influx of weapons and money to FSA fighters has increased the tempo of fighting,
bringing clashes to the streets of Damascus and widening the conflict throughout Syria
to the point where the International Committee of the Red Cross has termed the
revolution a “civil war”.
There are strong moral arguments for arming the rebels and ending President Assad’s
regime. But who exactly is financing the revolution and what is their agenda?
Syria’s revolution is expensive. In just a few months of fighting, Lieutenant Ahmad has
learnt how high the financial costs can be. In the valley beneath us, clearly visible in the
light of late afternoon, a Syrian army unit mans a heavily fortified post on the highway
leading southwest to the city of Lattakia. A fortnight ago, Lieutenant Ahmad led 70
men in a night raid on the post, killing 14 Syrian soldiers and leaving two armoured
BMP fighting vehicles aflame.
“We hit them hard, but it cost a lot,” he admitted, cradling a Polish Kalashnikov as he
looked down at the Syrian post. The rumble of artillery echoed in the distance and
smoke from burning forests smeared the horizon.
“In just an hour of fighting we used 3,000 rounds of ammunition and 15 RPGs. At $2 a
bullet and around $1,000 for an RPG that’s about $21,000 (£13,500) at current prices.
Now, until the next payment of money arrives, we are restricted to defending
ourselves.”
Lieutenant Ahmad founded the khattiba three months ago, drawing together smaller
ad hoc FSA groups already present in the villages on the Jebel Akrad, a strategic
mountain range above the main road linking Lattakia with the interior.
“Weapons and munitions were my first big problem,” he said. “We didn’t have enough
of anything. But money is an issue too. It costs 96,000 Syrian pounds (£1,000) every
ten days just to feed my khattiba.”
Yet soon after forming his unit, Lieutenant Ahmad was approached by a Syrian
businessman living in Turkey, who offered to act as a “wasta”, a go-between on behalf
of a mysterious sponsor. Lieutenant Ahmad agreed, but not all his fighters were happy.
Some, including Lieutenant Ahmad’s elder brother Mohammed, knew the businessman
by reputation as a black marketeer and warned against involvement with him. “The
wasta is a crook,” Mohammed said. “He makes money out of us with false accounting
for our ammunition expenditure and keeps cash for himself. Each khattiba here has
similar problems with their middlemen. But ours is the worst.”
The first lump sum of cash duly arrived, along with a computer and Chinese radios.
Then came the weapons: AK47s and RPGs smuggled in via Turkey from Libya and
Iraq. More money followed, usually Syrian currency, but sometimes US dollars. The
largest single tranche to the khattiba in the past three months has been 1.5 million
Syrian pounds, equivalent to £15,000. The sum was just in excess of the amount
needed for a night raid. But Lieutenant Ahmad and his rebels remained uneasy.
“The middleman’s accounts are deliberately chaotic so that he can take money for
himself,” he said. “And the equipment is often not as it should be. We asked for good
boots. The middleman bought them using the sponsor’s money. They were Chinese.
They were useless. They fell apart after ten days. I’m sure the wasta charges the
sponsor for high-quality equipment, and keeps the cash difference.”
Later, a Syrian activist who knew the middleman personally told me that the man was
based in the southern Turkish city of Antakya and acquired weapons and money
through a second Syrian businessman, a former dentist with close business ties to
Saudi Arabia. But after that the trail goes cold. Is it official Saudi support coming in
through Syrian go-betweens, or that of a private donor, Salafists or the Muslim
Brotherhood?
“I don’t know the answer,” said Lieutenant Ahmad. “It would be much better if the
sponsor dealt with us directly, or else through an official central committee run by the
FSA. At least then we would have some form of transparency and end the deception.
“But what choice do we have? We want to overthrow Assad. And to do that we need
money and weapons.”
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